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been the same as previously, $2,700. There was no change in 
her rank or grade, working hours or duties. The deductions 
were not made because of any inefficiency on her part, but 
as a penalty for failing to go to school. Respondents in their 
brief contend that there is no penalty involved; but we note 
that in the Bulletin issued by the board in September, 1936, 
it is recited: 'It was concluded that teachers reaching the 
maximum should be stimulated to maintain their professional 
proficiency by continued training. To make this effective, 
it was agreed that a salary penalty should be imposed upon 
those failing to do this within a reasonable length of time.' 
(Italics ours.) 
"Also, the rule as applied to petitioner is discriminatory. 
The evidence shows that high school teachers of English with 
as little as ten years of experience were receiving $2,748 per 
annum, while petitioner, with twenty-nine years of successful 
experience, was, after the reductions, the lowest paid among 
such teachers. There was no general reduction of salaries, 
the only ones reduced being those of teachers who had not 
complied with the 'condition.' 
"In Kacsur v. Board of Education, 18 Ca1.2d 586, 592 [116 
P.2d 593], the court said: 
" 'However, there are limitations on the power of boards 
of trustees to change salaries of permanent teachers. One 
of the" legal consequences" referred to in the Abraham case, 
supra (Abraham v. Sims, 2 Ca1.2d 698 [42 P.2d 1029]), is 
that the fixing of salaries must not be discriminatory, arbi-
trary or unreasonable. The above cited cases all so qualify 
the general power of the administrative agencies to fix the 
salaries of permanent teachers. Because of this qualification 
it necessarily follows that there must be a comparison with 
the salaries of other teachers or salaries of previous years. 
If this could not be done, the qualification would be mean-
ingless.' (Italics ours.) 
"The record there showed that the respondent board at-
tempted to reduce appellants' salaries from $1,600 to $1,325, 
practically the minimum allowed by law. No other salaries 
were reduced; most of them were raised; and the salary of 
a teacher of approximately the same years of service, expe-
rience and qualifications remained the same. The court said: 
" 'These facts standing alone are sufficient to force the 
conclusion that the attempted action of the board was un-
N/A 
\ 
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reasonable and arbitrary. The fact that the salary of a 
teacher of like experience and years of service was not re-
duced is particularly strong in support of appellants' claim 
of discrimination. That there must be some degree of uni-
formity was recently recognized by this court in the case 
of Fry v. Board of Education, 17 Ca1.2d 753 [112 P.2d 
229]), wherein it is stated at page 757; "It must be conceded 
that, within the limits fixed by the School Code, the Board 
has discretionary control over the salaries of teachers. (Cit-
ing cases.) However, it must also be conceded that the 
Legislature had enjoined on such Boards, with reasonable 
limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary 
for those performing like services with like experience .... " , 
,. And in that case the Supreme Court reversed the finding 
of the trial court that the board had not acted arbitrarily. 
"We conclude that the rule of the board requiring peti-
tioner to acquire additional college units or suffer aredue-
tion in salary to which she was otherwise entitled was in ex-
cess of the powers of the board. The judgment is reversed 
and the lower court is directed to issue the writ of mandamus 
as prayed." 
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed. 
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 3, 
1944. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a re-
hearing. 
[So F. No. 16951. In Bank. July 5, 1944.] 
GLADYS ESCOLA, Respondent, v. COCA COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY OF FRESNO (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Negligence - Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limita.tions of 
Doctrine.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply 
unless defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing 
[1] See 19 Cal.Jur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 135; [2,4] Negligence, 
§ 136; [3] Negligence, § 128; [5] Negligence, § 141; [6,7,9] Neg-
ligence, § 138; [8] Negligence, § 56; [10] Negligence, § 139. 
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the injury and the accident is of such a nature that it ordi-
narily would not occur in the absence of negligence by de-
fendant. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumental-
itY.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied on 
the theory that defendant had control of the instrumentality 
causing the injury at the time of the alleged negligent act, 
although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff 
first proves that the condition of the instrumentality had not 
been changed after it left defendant's possession. 
[S] Id.-Evidence--Burden of Proof.-In an action against a bot-
tling company for injuries sustained by a restaurant employee 
when a bottle of beverage broke in her hand, defendant is 
not charged with the duty of showing affirmatively that some-
thing happened to the bottle after it left its control or man-
agement; the burden is on plaintiff to show that there was 
due care during that period and that she handled the bottle 
carefully. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumental-
ity.-While the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not be ap-
plied unless plaintiff has eliminated the possibility that he 
was responsible for the accident, a plaintiff suing a bottling 
company for injuries resulting from the breaking of a bottle 
in her hand need not eliminate every remote possibility of 
injury to the bottle after it left defendant's control; the re-
quirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a reason-
able inference that the bottle was not accessible to extrane-
ous harmful forces, and that it was carefully handled by 
plaintiff or any third person who may have moved or touched 
it. 
[5] Id.-Evidence-Su1II.ciency.-In an action against a bottling 
company for ,injuries sustained by a restaurant employee 
when a bottle of beverage broke in her hand, the evidence 
supported a reasonable inference that the bottle was not dam-
aged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant 
by defendant. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In 
order that a restaurant employee, suing a bottling company 
for injuries sustained by reason of a bottll, of beverage break-
ing in her hand, may rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
to supply an inference that defendant's negligence was re-
sponsible for the defective condition of the bottle at the time 
it was delivered to the restaurant, it must appear that bottles 
of carbonated liquid are not ordinarily defective without 
negligence by the bottling company. 
\ 
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[7] ld. - Evidence - Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-
Where a bottle of beverage breaking in a restaurant' em-
ployee's hand was charged with gas under pressure, and the 
charging of the bottle was within the exclusive control of 
defendant bottling company, an inference of defendant's neg-
ligence would arise, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
if the bottle was excessively charged. 
~) Id.-Exercise of Care by Bottling Company.-Where an ex-
plosion . resulted from a defective beverage bottle containing 
a safe pressure, the bottling company would be liable if it 
negligently failed to discover such flaw. If the defect were 
visible, an inference of negligence would arise from the 
company's failure to discover it. 
[9] Id.-E·vidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In 
an action against a bottling company for injuries sustained 
by a restaurant employee when a bottle of beverage broke 
or exploded in her hand, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of de-
fendant's negligence, where the method used by the bottle 
maker for testing bottles for defects not apparent to the 
eye was almost infallible, where used bottles were filled and 
distributed by defendant without again being subjected to 
the same tests, and where, regardless of whether the explo-
sion in question was caused by an excessive charge or a de-
fect in the glass, there was a sufficient showing that neither 
cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had 
been used, defendant having had exclusive control over both 
the charging and inspection of the bottles. 
[10] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Rebutting Inference.-
When a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference 
of negligence which arises on application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the 
jury to' determine whether the inference has beeD dispelled. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mer-
ced County. James D. Garibaldi, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from 
bursting of bottle of coca cola. Judgment for plaintiff af-
firmed. 
H. K. Landram for Appellant. 
C. Ray Robinson, Willard B. Treadwell, Dean S. Lesher, 
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GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was in-
jured when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her hand. She 
:illeged that defendant company, which had bottled and de-
, livered, the alleged defective bottle to her employer, was neg-
ligent in selling "bottles containing said beverage which on 
account of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some 
defect in the bottle was dangerous . . . and .likely to explode." 
This appeal is from a judgment upon a jury verdict in fa~or 
, of plaintiff. 
Defendant's driver delivered several cases of Coca Cola to 
the restaurant, placing them on the floor, one on top of the 
other, under and behind the counter, where they remained 
at least thirty-six hours. Immediately before the accident, 
plaintiff picked up the top case and set it upon a near-by ice 
cream cabinet in front of and about three feet from the re-
frigerator. She then proceeded to take the bottles from the 
case with her right hand, one at a time, and put them into 
:the refrigerator. Plaintiff testified that after she had placed 
three bottles in the refrigerator and had moved the fourth 
bottle about eighteen inches from the case "it exploded in 
'. my hand." The bottle broke into two jagged pieces and in-
flicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels, nerves and 
muscles of the thumb and palm of the hand. Plaintiff fur-
ther testified that when the bottle exploded, "It made a sound 
similar, to an electric light bulb that would have dropped. 
It made a loud pop." Plaintiff's employer testified, "I was 
about twenty feet from where it actually happened and I 
heard the· explosion." A fellow employee, on the opposite 
side of the counter, testified that plaintiff "had the bottle, 
I should judge, waist high, and I know that it didn't bang 
either the case or the door or another bottle . . . when it 
POPlJed. It sounded just like II. fruit jar would blow up .... " 
The witness further testified that the contents of thc bottle 
"flew all over herself and myself and the walls and one thing 
and another." 
The top portion of the bottle, with the cap, remai-ned in 
plaintiff's hand, and the lower portion fell to the floor hut 
did not break. The broken bottle was not produced at the 
trial, the pieces having been thrown away by an employee 
of the restaurant shortly after the accident. Plaintiff, how-
. ever, described the broken pieces, and a diagram of the bottlc 
was made showing the location of the "fracture line" where 
the bottle broke in two. 
\ 
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One of defendant's drivers, called as a wituess by plaintiff,. 
testified that he had seen other bottles of Coca Cola in the 
past explode and had found broken bottles in thc warehouse 
when he took the cases out, but that he did not know what 
made them blow up. 
Plaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the court 
that being unable to show any specific acts of negligence she 
relied completely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
does not apply in this case, and that the evidence is insufii-
cient to support the judgment. 
Many jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in cases iu-
volving exploding bottles of carbonated beverages. (See PaY'fl,(J 
v. Rome Ooca-Oola Bottling 00., 10 Ga.App. 762 [73 S.E. 
1087]; StolZe v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520 [271 S:W. 
497, 39 A.L.R. 1001] ; Bradley v. Oonway Springs Bottling 
00., 154 Kan. 282 [118 P.2d 601] ; Ortego v. Nehi Bottling 
Works, 199 La. 599 [6 So.2d 677] ; MacPherson v. Oanada 
Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 129 N.J.L. 365 [29 A.2d 868] ; Macres 
v. Ooca-Oola Bottling 00., 290 Mich. 567 [287 N.W. 922]; 
Benkendorfer v. Garrett (Tex. Civ. App.), 143 S.W.2d 1020.) 
Other courts for varying reasons have refused to apply tho 
doctrine in such cases. (See Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.~d 
674 [129 P.2d 485] ; Loebig's GuardJian v. Ooca-Oola Bottling 
00., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910] ; Stewart v. Orystal Ooca, 
Oola Bottling 00., 50 Ariz. 60 [68 P.2d 952] ; Glaser v. Seitz, 
35 Misc. 341 [71 N.Y.S. 942] ; Luciano v. Morgan, 267 App. 
Div. 785 [45 N.Y.S.2d 502] ; cf. Berkens v. Denver Ooca-OoZa 
Bottling 00., 109 Colo. 140 [122P.2d 884]; Ruffi;n, v. Ooca 
Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514 [42 N.E.2d 259] ; Slack v. 
Premier-Pabst Corporation,40 Del. 97 [5 A.2d 516] ; Wheeler 
v. Laurel Bottling Works, III Miss. 442 [71 So. 743, L.R.A. 
1916E 1074] ; Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Gretes, -- Va. --
[27 S.E.2d 925] ; Dau v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284 [66 S.E. 135, 
28 L.R.A.N .S. 949].) It would serve no useful purpose to 
discuss the reasoning of the foregoing eases in detail, since 
the problem is whether under the facts shown in the instant 
case the conditions warranting application of the doctrine 
have been satisfied. 
[1] Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1) defen-
dant had exclusive control of the thing causing the injury 
and (2) the accident is of sueh a nature that it ordinarily 
458 :E1SCOLA V. COCA COLA :SOTTLt:N"G CO. [24 C.M 
would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defen-
dant. (Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 616-617 
[140 P.2d 369], and authorities there cited; cf. Hinds v. 
Wheadon, 19 Ca1.2d 458, 461 [121 P.2d 724]; Prosser on 
Torts [1941], 293-301.) 
[2] Many authorities state that the happening of the ac-
cident does not speak for itself where it took place some time 
after defendant had relinquished control of the instrumental-
ity causing the injury. Under the more logical view, how-
ever, the doctrine may be applied upon the theory that d,,-
fendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent act, 
although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff 
first proves that the condition of the instrumentality had not 
been changed after it left the defendant's possession. (See 
cases collected in Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 
617-618 [140 P.2d 369].) [3] As said in Dunn v. Hoff-
man Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556 [20 A.2d 352, 354], "de-
fendant is not charged with the duty of showing affirmatively 
that something happened to the bottle after it left its control 
or management; ... to get to the jury the plaintiff must show 
that there was due care during that period. " Plaintiff must 
also prove that she handled the bottle carefully. The reason 
for this prerequisite is set forth in Prosser on Torts, supra, 
at page 300, where the author states: "Allied to the condi-
tion of exclusive control in the defendant is that of absence 
of any action on the part of the plaintiff contributing to the 
accident. Its purpose, of course, is to eliminate the possibil. 
ity that it was the plaintiff who was responsible. If the 
boiler of a locomotive explodes while the plaintiff engineer 
is operating it, the inference of his own negligence is at least 
as great as that of the defendant, and res ipsa loquitur will 
not apply until he has accounted for his own conduct." 
(See, also, Olson v. Whitthorne &7 Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 208· 
209 [263 P. 518, 58 A.L.R. 129].) [4] It is not necessary, 
of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote possibility of 
injury to the bottle after defendant lost control, and the reo 
quirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a rea· 
sonable inference that it was not accessible to extraneous 
harmful forces and that it was carefully handled by plaintiff 
or any third person who may have moved or touched it. 
(Cf. Prosser, supra, p. 300.) If such evidence is presented, . 
the question become& one for the trier of fact (see, e. g., 
\ 
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MacPherson v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 129 N.J.L. 365 
[29 A.2d 868, 869]), and, accordingly, the issue should be 
submitted to the jury under proper instructions. 
In the present case no instructions were requested or given 
on this phase of the case, although general instructions upon 
res ipsa loquitur were given. Defendant, however, has made 
no claim of error with reference thereto on this appeal. 
[5] Upon an examination of the record, the evidence ap-
pears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the 
bottle here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force 
after delivery to the restaurant by defendant. It follows, 
therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at 
the time defendant relinquished control, because sound and 
properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordi-
narily explode when carefully handled. 
[6] The next question, then, is whether plaintiff may rely 
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference 
that defendant's negligence was responsible for the defective 
condition of the bottle at the time it was delivered to the 
restaurant. Under the general rules pertaining to the doc· 
trine, as set forth above, it must appear that· bottles of car-
bonated liquid are not ordinarily defective without negli-
gence by the bottling company. In 1 Shearman and Redfield 
on Negligence (rev. ed. 1941), page 153, it is stated that: 
"The doctrine . . . requires evidence which shows at least 
~he probability that a particular accident could not have 
(lccurred without legal wrong by the defendant." 
An explosion such as took place here might have been 
caused by an excessive internal pressure in a sound bottle, 
by a defect in the glass of a bottle containing a safe pressure, 
or by a combination of these two possible causes. The ques-
tion is whether under the evidence there was a probability 
that defendant was negligent in any of these respects. If so, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. 
[7] The bottle was admittedly charged with gas under 
pressure, and the charging of the bottle was within the ex-
clusive control of defendant. As it isa matter of common 
knowledge that an overcharge would not ordinarily result 
without negligence, it follows under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur that if the bottle was in fact excessively charged an 
inference of defendant's negligence would arise. [8] If 
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the explosion resulted from a defective bottle containing a 
:;afe pre~sure, the defendant would be liable if it negligently 
failed to discover such flaw. If the defect were visible, an 
inference of negligence viould arise from the failure of defen-
dant to discover it. Where defects are discoverable, it may 
be assumed that they will not ordinarily e:mape detection if a 
reasonable inspection is made, and if such a defect is over-
looked an inference arises that a proper inspection was not 
lap-de. A difficult problem is presented where the defect is 
ullknown and consequently might have been one not discover-
t:ble by a reasonable, practicable insp~tion. In the Honea 
case we refused to take judicial notice o't the technical prac-
tices and information available to the bottling industry for 
finding defects which cannot be seen. In the present case, 
however, we are supplied with evidence of the standard meth-
ods used for testing bottles. 
A chemical engineer for the Owens-Illinois Glass Company 
and its Pacific Coast subsidiary, maker of Coca Cola bottles, 
explained how glass is manufactured and the methods used 
in testing and inspecting bottles. He testified that his com-
pany is the largest manufacturer of glass containers in the 
United States, and that it uses the standard methods for 
testing bottles recommended by the glass containers a~ocia­
tion. A pressure test is made by taking a sample from each 
mold every three hours-approximately one out of every 
GOO bottles-and subjecting the sample to an internal pressure 
of 450 pounds per square inch, which is sustained for one 
minute. (The normal pressure in Coca Cola bottles is less 
than 50 pounds per square inch.) The sample bottles are 
also subjected to the standard thermal shock test. The wit-
ness stated that these tests are "pretty near" infallible. 
[9] It thus appears that there is available to the industry 
a commonly-used method of testing bottles for defects not 
apparent to the eye, which is almost infallible. Since Coca 
Cola bottles are subjected to these tests by the manufacturer, 
it is not likely that they contain defects when delivered to 
the bottler which are not discoverable by visual inspection. 
Both new Dnd used bottles are filled and distributed by de-
fendant. The used bottles are not again subjected to the 
tests referred to above, and it may be inferred that defects 
not discoverable by visual inspection do not develop in bottles 
after they are manufaetured. Obviously, if such defects do 
July 1944] ESCOtA V. OOCA COLA ~OTTtING CO. 
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occur in used bottles there is a duty upon the bottler to make 
appropriate tests before they are refilled, and if such tests 
are not commercially practicable the bottles should not be 
re-used. This would seem to be particularly true where a 
charged liquid is placed in the bottle. It follows that II. de-
fect which would make the bottle lIDsound could be discov-
ered by reasonable and practicable tests. 
Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion 
was caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the glass, 
there is a sufficient showing that neither cause would ordi-
narily have been present if due care had been used. Further, 
defendant had exclusive control over both tho charging and 
inspection of the bottles. Accordingly, all the requirements 
necessary to entitle plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of reI:! ipsa 
loquitur to supply an inference of negligence are present. 
[10] It is true that defendant presented evidence tend-
ing to show that it exercised considerable precaution by care-
fully regulating and checking the pressure in the bottles and 
by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at sev-
eral stages during the bottling process. It is well settled, 
however, that when a defendant produces evidence to rebut 
the inference of negligence which arises upon application of 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question 
of fact for the jury to determine whether the inference ha.<; 
been dispelled. (Druzanioh v. Oriley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444 
[122 P.2d 53] ; Michener v. HuttO'n, 203 Cal. 604, 610 [265 
P. 238, 59 A.L.R. 480].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment, but I believe 
the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out 
as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the 
present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized that 
a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article 
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury 
to human beings. McPherson v. Buicl. Motor 00., 217 N.Y. 
382 [111 N.E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440, L.R.A. 1916F 696], 
established the principle, recognized by this court, that irre-
spective of privity of contract, the manufacturer is respon-
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sible for an injury caused by such an article to any person 
who comes in lawful contact with it. (Sheward v. Virtue, 20 
Ca1.2d 410 [126 P.2d 345] ; Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 
1 Cal.2d 229 [34 P.2d 481].) In these cases the source of the 
manufacturer's liability was his negligence in the manufac-
turing process or in the inspection of component parts sup-
plied by others. Even if there is no negligence, however, pub-
lic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it 
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health in-
herent in defective products that reach the market. It is 
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate Wille hazards 
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public can-
not. Those who suffer injury from defective products are 
unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury 
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming mis-
fortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the 
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is 
to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products 
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such prod-
ucts nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the 
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury 
they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not 
negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for 
its reaching the market. However intermittently such in-
juries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, 
the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general 
one. Against such a risk there should be general and con-
stant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford 
such protection. 
The injury from a defective product does not become a 
matter of indifference because the defect arises from causes 
other than the negligence of the manufacturer, such as negH-
gence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose de-
fects could not be revealed by inspection (see Sheward v. Vir-
tue, 20 Cal.2d 410 [126 P.2d 345] ; O'Rourke v. Day & Night 
Water Heater Co., Ltd., 31 Cal.App.2d 364 [88 P.2d 191] ; 
Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292 [181 N.E. 576]), or 
unknown causes that even by the device of res ipsa loquitur 
cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer. The 
inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative 
showing of proper care. If the evidence against the fae.'t in-
/. 
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ferred is "clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature 
that it cannot rationally be disbelieved, the court must in-
struct the jury that the nonexistence of the fact has been 
established as a matter of law." (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 
457, 461 [126 P.2d 868].) An injured person, however, is 
not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or identify 
the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with th& 
manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In 
leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been 
dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence 
rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly 
circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose 
what is in reality liability without negligence. If public pol-
icy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for 
their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not 
to fix that responsibility openly. 
In the case of foodstuffs, the public policy of the state is 
formulated in a criminal statute. Section 26510 of the Health 
and Safety Code prohibits the manufacturing, preparing, 
compounding, packing, selling, offering for sale, or keeping 
for sale, or advertising within the state, of any adulterated 
food. Section 26470 declares that food is adulterated when 
"it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under in-
sanitary conditions whereby it may have been rendered 
diseased, unwholesome or injurious to health." The statute 
imposes criminal liability not only if the food is adulterated, 
but if its container, which may be a bottle (§ 26451), has any 
deleterious substance (§ 26470 (6», or renders the product 
injurious to health. (§ 26470 (4». The criminal liability 
under the statute attaches without proof of fault, so that the 
manufacturer is under the duty of ascertaining whether an 
article manufactured by him is safe. (People v. Sohwartz, 
28 Cal.App.2d SUpp. 775 [70 P.2d 1017].) Statutes of this 
kind result in a strict liability of the manufacturer in tort to 
the member of the public injured. (See cases cited in Prosser, 
Torts, p. 693, note 69.) 
The statute may well be applicable to a bottle whose defects 
cause it to explode. In any event it is significant that the 
statute imposes criminal liability without fault, reflecting the 
public policy of protecting the public from dangerous prod-
ucts placed on the market, irrespective of negligence in their 
manufacture. While the Legislature imposes criminal lia-
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bility only with regard to food products and their containers, 
there are many other sources of danger. It is to the public 
interest to prevent injury to the public from any defective 
goods uy the imposition of civil liability generally. 
The retailer, even though not equipped to test a product, 
is under an absolute liability to his customer, for the implied 
warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable qual. 
ity include a warranty of safety of the product. (Goetten 
v. Owl Drug Co., 6 CaL2d 683 [59 P.2d 142] ; Mix v. Ingersoll 
Cundy Co., 6 Ca1.2d 674 [59 P.2d 144] ; Oindraux v. Maurice 
Mercantile Co., 4 Ca1.2d 206 [47 P.2d 708] ; Jensen Jl..-Berris, 
31 Cal.App.2d 537 [88 P.2d 220] ; Ryan v. Progressive Gro~ 
eery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388 [175 RE. 105; 74 A.L.R. 339]; 
Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410 [118 N.E. 853, L.R.A. 1918F 
1172] .) This warranty is not necessarily a contractual one 
(Chamberlain Co. v. Allis·Chalmers etc. Co., 51 CaLApp.2d 
(;20, 524 [125 P.2d 113] ; see 1 Williston on Sales, 2d ed., 
§§ 197-201), for public policy requires that the buyer be in· 
sured at the seller's expense against injury. (Race v. Krum, 
supra; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra; Chapman 
v. Ro!}genkamp, 18:,l Ill.App. 117, 121; Ward v. Great Atlan· 
tic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 94 [120 N.E. 225, 5 A.L.R. 
242]; see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable 
Quality, 27 ~Iinn.L.Rev. 117, 124; Brown, The Liability of 
Retail Dealers For Defcctive Food Products, 23 Minn.L.Rev. 
585.) The courts recognize, however, that the retailer can· 
not bear the burden of this warranty, and allow him to re-
coup any losses by means of the warranty of safety attending 
the wholesaler's or manufacturer's sale to him. (Ward v. 
O"eat Atlantic &; Pacific Tea Co., supra; see Waite, Retail 
ltesponsibility and J1tdicial Law Making, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 494, 
509.) Such a procedure, however, is needlessly circuitous and 
engenders wasteful litigation. Much would be gained if the 
injured pcrson could base his action directly on the manu· 
facturer's warranty. 
The liability of the manufacturer to an immediate buyer 
injured by a defective product follows without proof of negli-
gence from the implied warranty of safety attending the sale. 
Ordinarily, however, the immediate buyer is a dealer who does 
not intend to use the product himself, and if the warranty of 
safety is to serve the purpose of protecting health and safety 
it must give rights to others than the dealer. In the words 
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of Judge Cardozo in the McPherson case: "The dealer was 
indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some 
approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used. 
Yet, the defendant would have us say that he W88 the o.ne per-
son whom it was under a legal duty to protect. The law does 
not lead us to so inconsequent a solution.' I While the de. 
fendant's negligence in the McPherson case made it unneces-
sary for the court to base liability on warranty, Judge Car-
dozo's reasoning recognized the injured person as the real 
party in interest and effectively disposed of the theory that 
the liability of the manufacturer incurred by his warranty 
should apply only to the immediate purchaser. It thus paves 
the way for a standard of liability that would make the manu-
facturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there 
is no negligence. 
This court and many others have extended protection ac-
cording to such a standard to consumers of food products, 
taking the view that the right of a consumer injured by un~ 
wholesome food does not depend "upon the intricacies of the 
law of sales" and that the warranty of the manufacturer ,to 
the consumer in absence of privity of contract rests on public 
policy. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272, 
282 [93 P.2d 799] ; Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 321, 322, 
323 [160 C.C.A. 111, L.R.A. 1918D 798] ; Decker & Sons v: 
Capps, 139 Tex. 609 [164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479] ; see 
Perkins, Unwholesome Food As A Source of Liability, 5 Iowa 
L.Bull. 6, 86.) Dangers to life and health inhere in other 
consumers' goods that are defective and there is no reason to 
differentiate them from the dangers of defective food prod-
ucts. (See Bohlen, Studies in Torts, Basis of Affirmative Ob-
ligations, American Cases Upon The Liability of Manufac-
turers and Vendors of Personal Property, 109, 135; Llewellyn, 
On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 Col.L.Rev. 699, 704, 
note 14; Prosser, Torts, p. 692.) 
In the food products cases the courts have resorted to vari-
ous fictions to rationalize the extension of the manufacturer'. 
warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs with the 
chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer is assigned to 
the consumer; that the consumer is a third party beneficiary 
of the rnanufacturer's contract with the dealer. They have 
also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fiction ofnegH-
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gence: "Practically he must know it [the product] is fi.t,or 
bear the consequences if it proves destructive." (Parks v. 
O. O. Yost Pie 00., 93 Kan. 334 [144 P. 202, L.R.A. 1915C 
179]; see Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons 
Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 Va.L.Rev. 134.) 
Such fictions are not necessary to fix the manufacturer's lia-
bility under a warranty if the warranty is severed from the 
contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer and 
based on the law of torts (Decker & Sons v. Oapps, supra; 
Prosser, Torts, p. 689) as a strict liability. (See Green v. 
General Petroleum Oorp., 205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R. 
475J ; McGrath v. Basich Bros. Oonst. 00., 7 Cal.App.2d573 
[46 P.2d 981J; Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex.L. 
Rev., 399, 403; Feezer, Oapacity To Bear The Loss As A Fac-
tor In The Decision Of Oertain Types of Tort Oases, 78 U. of 
Pa.L.Rev. 805, 79 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 742 i Carpenter, The Doc. 
trine of Green v. General Petroleum Oorp., 5 So.Cal.L.Rev. 
263, 271 i Pound, The End of Law As Developed In Legal 
Rules And Doctrines, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 195, 233. ) Warranties 
are not necessarily rights arising under a contract. An action 
on a warranty "was, in its origin, a pure action of tort," and 
only late in the historical development of warranties was an 
action in assumpsit allowed. (Ames, The History of Assump-
sit, 2 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 i 4 Williston on Contracts (1936) 
§ 970.) " And it is still generally possible where a distinction 
of procedure is observed between actions of tort and of con-
tract to frame the declaration for breach of warranty in ,tort. " 
(Williston, loco cit'i see Prosser, Warranty On Merchantable 
Quality, 27 Minn.L.Rev. 117, 118.) On the basis of the tort 
character of an action on a warranty, recovery has been al. 
lowed for wrongful death as it could not be in an action for 
breach of contract. (Greco V. S. S. Kresge 00., 277 N.Y. 26 
[12 N.E.2d 577, 115 A.L.R. 1020J i see Schlick V. New York 
Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182 [22 N.Y.S.2d 238J i Prosser, op. 
cit., p. 119.) As the court said in Greco V. S. S. Kresge Oo.~su­
pra, "Though the action may be brought solely for the breach 
of the implied warranty, the breach is a wrongful act, a de-
fault, and, in its essential nature, a tort." Even a seller's 
express warranty can arise from a noncontractual affirmation 
inducing a person to purchase the goods. (Ohamberlain 00. 
v. Allis-Ohalmers etc. 00.,51 Cal.App.2d 520 [125 P.2d 113].) 
"As an actual agreement to contract is not essential, the obli. 
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gation of a seller in such a case is one imposed by law as 
distmguished from one voluntarily assumed. It may be called 
an obligation either on a quasi-contract or quasi.tort, because 
remedies appropriate to contract and also to tort are appli. 
cable." (1 Williston on Sales, 2d ed. § 197 i see Ballantine, 
Classification of ObligaUons, 15 !Il.L.Rev. 310, 325.) 
As handicrarts have been replaced by mass production with 
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close rela· 
tionship between the producer and consumer or a product has 
been altered. Manuracturing processes, frequently valuable 
secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken 
of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or 
skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness ofa prod. 
uct, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his 
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of 
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and 
marketing devices such as trade-marks. (See Thomas V. Win-
chester, 6 N.Y. 397 [57 Am.Dec. 455] iBaxter V. Ford Motor 
00., 168 Wash. 456 [12 P.2d 409, 15P.2d 1118, 88 A.L.R. 
521] i Orist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App.Div. 114 [243N.Y.S. 
496], affirmed 255 N.Y. 624 [175 N.E. 341J i see also Handler, 
False and Misleading Advertising, 39 Yale L.J. 22 i Rogers, 
Good Will, Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading (1914) ch. VI, 
A Study of The Consumer, p. 65 et seq.; Williston, Liability 
For Honest Misrepresentations As Deceit, Negligence Or War-
ranty,'42 Harv.L.Rev. 733; 18 Cornell L.Q. 445.) Consumers 
no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, 
relying on the reputation or the manufacturer or the trade 
mark. (See Max Factor ~ 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 
463 [55 P.2d 177]; Old Dearborn etc. 00. v. Seagram-Dis-
tillers Oorp., 2,99 U.S. 183 [57 S.Ot. 139, 81 L.Ed. 109, 106 
A.L.R. 1476] i Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade Mark 
Protection, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 818.) Manufacturers have 
sought to justify that faith by increasingly high standards of 
inspection and a readiness to make good on defective products 
by way of replacements and refunds. (See Bogert and Fink, 
Business Practices Regarding Warranties In The Sale Of 
Goods, 25 m.L.Rev. 400.) The manufacturer's obligation to 
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship 
between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of 
a product has become so complicated as to require one or more 
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intermediaries. Certainly there is greater reason to impose 
liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but 
a conduit of a product that he is not himself able to test. (See 
Soule, Consumer Protection, 4 Encyclopedia of The Social 
Sciences, 282; Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability For Injuries 
Caused By His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 Mich.L. 
Rev. 1; Llewellyn, Cases And Materials on Sales, 340 et seq.) 
The manufacturer's liability should, of course, be defined in 
terms of the safety of the produClt in normal and proper use, 
and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to. 
the product as it reached the market. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 3, 
1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[Sac. No. 5616. In Bank. July 10, 1944.] 
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[1&, Ib] Public Securities - Interest - Bonds-After Maturity.-
Where government bonds are issued which provide for inter. 
est, the interest continues after maturity unless there is some 
provision in the authorizing statute evincing an intent that 
. they should not bear such interest. (Meyer v. City and County 
of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 131, 88 P. 722, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 110, 
and Bullard v. Riverside County Drainage District, 41 Cal.App. 
2d 900, 107 P.2d 929, disapproved.) 
[2] Id.-Interest-Bonds-After Maturity.-There is a clear dis-
tinction between a government obligation which makes no men. 
tion of interest and an obligation, such as a bond, where the 
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 1051; 43 Am.Jur. 517. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,5] Public Securities, § 19; 
(3] Public Securities, § 1; [6-10] Reclamation, § 86(1). 
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authorizing law and the bond itself provide for interest. 
Where the statute states that the bond shall bear interest the 
only reasonable implication is that it shall continue to bear 
interest after maturity. 
[3] Id.-Nature and Characteristics.-Government bonds are or-
dinarily classed with negotiable instruments and can pass freely 
from hand to hand. They are the solemn and binding obliga-
tion of the government. 
[4] Id.-Interest-Bonds-After Maturity.-The interest accruing 
after maturity of government bonds which provide for interest 
is not accurately speaking, damages, but is rather an implied 
part of the basic contract. There is no derogation of sovereign 
immunity in applying this principle, or in concluding that Civ. 
Code, § 3289, is applicable. . 
[5] Id.-Interest - Coupons-After Maturity.-As distinguished 
from interest on the principal of matured government bonds, 
there is ordinarily no provision for interest on the interest 
coupons at any time, and hence the general rule is applicable 
that in~erest will not run against a government obligation un-
less it is imposed by statute or authorized contract. 
[6] Reclamation-Bonds-Interest After Maturity.-Reclamation 
bonds issued under Pol. Code, § 3480 (as in existence in 1925), 
§ 3480b (formerly § 3480%), which affirmatively specify' that 
such a bond shall bear interest until paid, continue to bear inter-
est after maturity, there being nothing in such sections which 
evince o.n intent that interest should not continue after maturity. 
The elimination from § 3480, by amendment in 1917, of a former 
clause that interest did continue on the bonds after maturity, 
but that it shall cease unless the bonds are presented and cer-
tain conditions exist, evinces the thought that while interest 
continues, the restrictions on that continuance are no longer 
effective. 
[7] Id.-Bonds-Interest Coupons-Interest After Maturity.-In-
terest coupons attached to reclamation bonds issued under Pol. 
Code, § 3480 (as it existed in 1925), do not bear interest after 
maturity, as the elimination from that section, by amendment in 
1917, of a former clause expressly authorizing interest under 
certain conditions only, indicates an intention that coupons 
under the amended act shall not bear interest. 
[8] Id.-Bonds-Interest After Maturity.-That portion of Pol. 
Code, § 3480 (as it existed in 1925), which states that within 
90 days before any interest payable date of reclamation dis-
trict bonds, the treasurer shall estimate the amount of money 
necessary to pay the interest and principal maturing on the 
[6] See 9 Cal.Jur. 918. 
